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NOTE
RECENT APPLICATIONS OF THE BAN ON CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS: JUDICIALLY
ENFORCED REFORM OF NONFEDERAL
PENAL INSTITUTIONS
Mercy without justice is the mother of dissolution. Justice
without mercy is cruelty.
St. Thomas Aquinas
Since its inception, the American penal system has been dominated
by the concept of "incarceration."1  Isolation of nonconformists was
deemed the solution to social problems as early as the days of the Puri-
tans. Unfortunately, confinement in an institution set apart from so-
ciety is still regarded by many authorities-prison officials and others
-as the most effective device to achieve behavorial "normalization."
Until recently, the judiciary did little to alter the effect of this
viewpoint. Indeed, the inadequacy of the process and conditions of
prison confinement were rarely confronted as issues for the courtroom.
2
Rather, federal tribunals long enunciated legal doctrines designed to
avoid intervention in affairs which could be categorized as relating to
prison administration; 3 whenever possible, the federal bench disdained
from inquiring into "local" penal matters.
In response to challenges of the constitutionality of confinement,
reference constantly was made to the inappropriateness of a petition for
1. See generally Teeters, State of Prisons in the United States: 1870-1970, 33
FED. PRoB. 18 (1969).
2. For a discussion of the limitations still governing many courts see Goldfarb
& Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 G-o. WAsHi. L. Rnv. 175 (1970).
3. Criticism of this judicial hesitancy has now begun to come from some of
the leading members of the federal bench. For example, Chief Justice Burger re-
cently commented as follows: "[W]e must soon turn increased attention and resources
to the disposition of the guilty once the factfinding process is over. Without effective
correctional systems an increasing proportion of our population will become chronic
criminals with no other way of life except the revolving door of crime, prison, and
more crime." Burger, A Proposal: A National Conference on Correctional Problems,
33 FED. PROB. 3 (1969).
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relief from the federal sphere.4 The courts developed a policy of "ab-
stention" from such cases, since they claimed to lack the expertise to
produce effective results.'
A closely related theory of non-intervention has been described as
the "hands off" approach. 6 Its exponents viewed most of the elements of
penal management as within the realm of the executive branch and
immune from judicial review.
7
Events transpiring in the last few years, however, have initiated
drastic changes in the judicial attitude toward prison confinement, The
4. See, e.g., Wilwording v. Swenson, 439 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir. 1971), where the
Eighth Circuit stated that federal relief on habeas corpus from conditions allegedly
"cruel and unusual" in a state penitentiary must be denied until after the exhaustion of
all available state judicial remedies. Thus the inmates were expected to test first the
propriety of mandamus, prohibition, injunction and other remedies afforded in the state
of their confinement.
5. Abstention may no longer be applied to deny a federal court jurisdiction
under inmate petitions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241, 248 (1967); Rivers v. Royster, 360 F.2d 592, 594 (4th Cir. 1966); Jones v.
Wittenburg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 98 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp.
127, 129-30 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1018 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); cf. Potwora v. Dillon, 386 F.2d 74, 76 n.5 (2d Cir. 1967).
6. See Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L.
REv. 795, 812 (1969); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial
Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963), both crediting
Fritch, Civil Rights of Prisoners 31 (1961) (documents prepared for the Federal Bu-
reau of Prisons) as the source of the phrase. The policy of "hands-off' is traced from
its birth to its questionable demise in Kraft, Prison Disciplinary Practices and Pro-
cedures: Is Due Process Provided?, 47 N.D. L. REV. 9. 11-21 (1970). A modified re-
birth of the "hands-off" rationale was evidenced, however, in a recent Second Circuit
decision, where the court stated: "Even a lifetime of study in prison administration
and several advanced degrees in the field would not qualify us as a federal court to
command state officials to shun a policy that they have decided is suitable because to
us the choice may seem unsound or personally repugnant. As judges we are obliged to
school ourselves in such objective sources as historical usage . . . before we may re-
sponsibly exercise the power of judicial review to declare punishment unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment." Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied sub. nom. Oswald v. Sostre, 40 U.S.L.W. 3431 (U.S. Mar. 6, 1972).
7. "Courts are without power to supervise prison administration or to interfere
with the ordinary prison rules or regulations." Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771
(10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954). See NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME
AND DELINQUENCY, A MODEL ACT FOR THE PROTECTION OF RIrHTS OF PRISONERS 9
(1972) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT].
8. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, at 3: "Although riots continue to occur-
and the abuses to which they are a response still prevail in many places- a new ele-
ment has been added to prisoner grievances: an assertion both of positive rights and
of the right to be protected against abuse. This can be regarded only as a heartening
development. The court decisions that have responded to the grievances by granting
relief affect the prison system as a whole as well as the individual petitioners. Certainly
this mode of seeking redress-through petitions to the court, to administrators, and to
legislators-is better than communication by riot."
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explosive violence within Attica and San Quentin and the constant media
coverage of certain outspoken inmates have thrust prison reformers
into the limelight. In addition there has been an increasing public
awareness that most inmates eventually return to society,9 affected in
many ways by their jail experiences. 10
Clearly, the groundwork has been laid for a new, almost sudden,
willingness to adjudicate the constitutionality of heretofore unquestioned
elements of confinement.:" Aspects of prison and jail life' 2 once merely
accepted as the rigors of incarceration have been subjected to judicial
scrutiny in both federal and state courts.' 3  The result has been renewed
consideration of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel
and unusual punishments,"' 14 with courts declaring unlawful the manner
9. President Nixon's thirteen point Federal Prison Reform directive to the
attorney general revealed that "[n]ineteen out of every twenty persons who are sent
to prison eventually return to society. What happens to them while they are in con-
finement is a tremendously important question for our country." Kraft, supra note
6, at 9.
10. The lasting effects of incarceration cannot be underestimated. Although de-
terrence of future criminal behavior is one goal of the penal system, present methods
of institutionalization seem to prevent its attainment: "The most important crime sta-
tistic is that 80% of all felonies are committed by repeaters. That is, four-fifths of our
major crimes are committed by people who are already known to the criminal justice
system." Ramsey Clark, When Punishment Is a Crime, PLAYBOY, Nov. 1970, at 100.
11. ' The consequence of abrupt and arrogant interference had to be weighed and
balanced with the compelling interests to uphold federal constitutional rights in accord
with modern precepts." Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127, 146 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
12. The Eighth Amendment applies to state and local penal institutions through
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962). The term "jail" is generally understood to mean a short-term hold-
ing facility under city or county control, while a "prison" is maintained by a state or
the federal government and is normally designed to hold felons sentenced for a year
or more. See Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prison-
ers' Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REv. 473 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Turner].
13. As then Circuit Judge Blackmun phrased it in Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d
571, 577 (8th Cir. 1968): "[Tlhe courts, including this one, have not hesitated to
entertain petitions asserting violatibns of fundamental rights, and where indicated, to
grant relief." In Glenn v. Ciccone, 370 F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 1966), the same court
remarked.that a factual showing of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment would support intervention by a federal court.
14. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." (emphasis added)
In addition, all state constitutions except three (Connecticut, Illinois, and Vermont)
contain similar prohibitions. S. RuBiN, THE LAW OF CiumiNAL CoRREcIoN 367 (1963).
The historical background of the Eighth Amendment limitation on the nature of
permissible punishment is a lengthy one. The precise wording of the Eighth Amendment
was derived from the English Bill of Rights of 1688, which guaranteed that no "cruel
and unusual punishment [would be] inflicted." 1 W. and M., Sess. 2, c. 2 (1689);
1 KENr's CommENTARIEs 606 (7th ed. 1851). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
yet to provide a concise definition or to suggest a clear boundary between acceptable
and unacceptable means of punishment The Supreme Court has traditionally em-
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of confinement even where sentences and commitments are concededly
valid.
This note seeks to examine those elements of incarceration in state
prisons and local jails which have recently been recognized as falling
under the umbrella of the Eighth Amendment. Emphasis will be placed
on the problems resulting from overcrowding, punitive segregation, pre-
trial detention, civilian and trusty staffing, sanitation, and medical
care.15 Special attention will be paid to the manner in which the Eighth
Amendment has been employed. In many cases-most notably, pri-
soners' class actions16 brought under the 1871 Civil Rights Act (com-
monly know as section 1983)11- the amendment has been used as the
phasized the breadth and flexibility of the Eighth Amendment rather than attempting
to illustrate its limitations. "Difficulty would attend the effort to define with
exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and un-
usual punishments shall not be inflicted ....... Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130,
136 (1878). "What constitutes cruel and unusual punishment has not been exactly
decided." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910). Former Chief Justice
Warren once stated that "the basic concept underlying the eighth amendment is nothing
less than the dignity of man . . . . [I]t must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (emphasis added). Judge (now Justice) Blackmun
stressed that the clause is dynamic and that it was designed to vindicate "broad and
idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency .... ." Jack-
son v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968). See generally Note, The Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV.
635 (1966). This fact alone has been a major reason that the Eighth Amendment
has been of minimal utility to inmates attacking deplorable penal conditions. The
only early cases in which punishment was found "cruel and unusual" involved the most
blatantly inhuman and intolerable penalties. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349 (1910) (fifteen years of hard labor in chains deemed cruel and unusual);
In re Birdsong, 39 F. 599 (S.D. Ga. 1889) (chaining prisoner so that he could neither
sit nor stand for 6 1/2 hours held cruel and unusual); Harper v. Wall, 85 F. Supp. 783
(D.N.J. 1949) (beating an inmate to force confession held to be cruel and unusual).
15. Limitations of space clearly preclude discussion of the landmark California
decision of People v. Anderson, - Cal. 3d -, - P.2d -, - Cal. Rptr. -
(1972), where the state's death penalty was ruled invalid under the prohibition of
"cruel or unusual punishment" of the California Constitution. The court in Anderson
specifically avoided reference to the Eighth Amendment, but the United States Supreme
Court will decide that issue this summer in a different set of cases.
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Class actions have been allowed where the
complaint questioned the constitutionality of conditions and practices affecting so
many inmates that joinder of all members of the class was impracticable. See, e.g.,
Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F.
Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Hamilton v. Schiro, No. 69-2443 (E.D. La. June 25,
1970); Brenneman v. Madigan, No. C 70-1911-AJZ (N.D. Cal., filed Sept. 8, 1970).
Each of these cases was a successful action against a group of public officials-in-
cluding mayors, city councils, county supervisors, wardens, sheriffs, and other local
authorities.
17. Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides: "Every
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
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basis for condemning the totality of conditions and practices existing
within a penal facility.' 8 In other instances, the amendment has pro-
vided the foundation for attacks on specific evils within individual in-
stitutions.' 9 The number of decisions relying on Eighth Amendment
grounds has rather abruptly increased in the last two years; this note will
attempt to show the direction such decisions have taken and the direction
future cases will likely follow.
Unconstitutional Conditions
Several previously unquestioned conditions of incarceration can
now be found violative of the Eighth Amendment. In the amendments
new and expanded role, the ban on cruel and unusual punishments has
been relied upon in the development of constitutional limits in the
areas of inmate population density, sanitation, and medical care. The
notion that such conditions of confinement, which affect an entire prison
population, can be declared unconstitutional is one of the more dramatic
developments in recent Eighth Amendment litigation.
Overcrowding
The problem of overcrowding is one of the most fundamental
flaws in the present penal system. Many of the more than 4,400 jails,
prisons, lockups, and workhouses scattered throughout the country are
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
Federal jurisdiction of inmate complaints under section 1983 is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1343(3) & 2201 (1970).
18. "The cruelty is a refined sort, much more comparable to the Chinese water
torture than to such crudities as breaking on the wheel." Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F.
Supp. 93, 99 (N.D. Ohio 1971). When a federal district court discovered recently
that the entire Virginia state penal system violated the most common notions of human
treatment, the tribunal enjoined the entire combination of conditions and practices to
which Virginia's 5,700 inmates had been subjected. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp.
621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
19. In addition to raising Eighth Amendment arguments successfully under sec-
tion 1983, inmates have secured relief from "cruel and unusual punishment" in habeas
corpus petitions. E.g., McCray v. State (Md. Cir. Ct. Nov. 11, 1971), noted
in 40 U.S.L.W. 2307 (1971) (institution for "defective delinquents" must improve
"cruel and unusual" conditions of solitary confinement); Bryant v. Hendrick (Phila.
Ct. C.P. Aug. 11, 1970), noted in 7 CRIM. L. REP. 2463 (1970) (pretrial de-
tainees secured transfer from local jail because of filthy conditions and overcrowding).
See also Graham v. Willingham, 384 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1967) (mandamus petition).
In one extraordinary case, the cruel and unusual punishment argument was ap-
plied in the context of an extradition proceeding. Michigan's Governor Milliken refused
to allow Arkansas authorities to take a prisoner back to Arkansas' "infamous" Cummins
Prison Farm, because "extradition would not serve the ends of justice." TIME, July 12,
1971, at 53.
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aged and inadequate for modem needs.20 Nevertheless, these institu-
tions often remain filled to-and even beyond-estimated maximum
capacity. For example, the Lucas County Jail (serving the Toledo,
Ohio area) was designed in the late nineteenth century to hold approxi-
mately 150 prisoners. Yet evidence in a recent case attacking the con-
ditions of confinement in that jail revealed that an average of 200 in-
mates had been kept in that institution throughout the entire period of
litigation.21 The inmates confined in the Lucas County facility, forced
to share cells measuring only six by nine feet in floor area, 22 succeeded
in their class action challenge brought under section 1983. The federal
district court held that the crowding in the Lucas County Jail was so
excessive as to constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" under the
Eighth Amendment.23
The first detailed and analytical evaluation of overcrowding as a
specific condition violating the Eighth Amendment was undertaken
in Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Board of Commis-
sioners, a recent decision by a Michigan Circuit Court. A three-Judge
state panel declared violative of the Eighth Amendment several condi-
tions and practices in Detroit's Wayne County Jail-most notably the
tremendous overcrowding of the facility.
20. Attorney Ronald Goldfarb stated in Why Don't We Tear Down Our Prisons?,
LoOK, July 27, 1971, at 45, that of the more than 400 "expensive, old, and over-
crowded prison institutions in the United States, sixty date back to the nineteenth cen-
tury and twenty-five began operations before the Civil War." In addition, there are
at least 4,000 locally operated penal and detention facilities. Id.
The opening remarks of Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman of Sub-
committee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, at the Subcommittee's
hearings in San Francisco on October 25, 1971 (on file at The Hastings Law Journal),
give an indication of our present system: "Dostoevski wrote, in The House of the Dead:
'The degree of civilization in a society can be judged by entering its prisons.' During
the past three days, this Subcommittee-charged with jurisdiction over the correctional
systems in this country-has inspected two State prisons, Soledad and San Quentin, and
a county jail, the Santa Rita Rehabilitation Center. . . . We have not yet completed
our endeavors, but I think it requires no special insight to conclude by now that, if
we employ the measuring rod posed by the Russian author, we must reach a fairly
bleak determination.
"Our correctional system, or perhaps non-system might be the more appropriate
descriptive term, is a conglomeration of a Federal system, 50 State systems and more
than 3,000 county and municipal systems. On any given day, approximately 11 mil-
lion people will be under the authority of one or more of these components. The cost
is over $1 billion annually.
"Yet we have failed, despite the money, despite the systems, despite the buildings."
21. Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 96 (N.D. Ohio 1971). The maximum
during the period was 272 inmates.
22. Id. at 95.
23. Id.
24. Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. C-173-217
(Mich. Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 25, 1971).
25. Id. at 19.
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This case is unusual in several respects. First, it was decided by
a state tribunal, while most of the significant judicial inroads toward
prison reform have come instead from federal courts. In fact, several
courts have remarked, when interceding in local penal matters, that
their involvement was necessary because state judges would be the
last to reform their own penal institutions."
The second novel aspect of the Wayne County Jail Inmates case
was the means in which the court analyzed the "overcrowding" itself.
Essentially, the court determined that there were three levels of inmate
capacity in the institution. To decide whether conditions of overcrowd-
ing had reached constitutional proportions, the court defined these three
levels or "capacities" and rendered its opinion as to the legal effect of
exceeding each barrier. The initial level was termed "design capacity,"
meaning the number of inmates the jail had initially been expected to
hold.2 7  The subsequent addition of a second bunk to each of the origi-
nal cells (done several years prior to this litigation) had increased the
population to its "rated capacity." 8  The third category, determined
by applying the state's housing law requirement as to airspace (a mini-
mum of 500 cubic feet per inhabitant for all structures), was termed the
"lawful inmate capacity." 29
The judges in Wayne County Jail Inmates, citing the Eighth Amend-
ment and several leading federal cases, held that "housing of prisoners in
excess of 'rated capacity' offends constitutional strictures against cruel
and unusual punishment. -. . ."30 However, because instant compliance
with "lawful inmate capacity" would have resulted in the release of over
half of the prisoners confined at the time of the decision, the panel de-
vised a gradual, three-step remedy. 31 The jail authorities were given
26. Federal courts have often remarked, when investigating state or county penal
practices in civil rights actions, that state courts would be slow to initiate reforms.
"Indeed, the objective of the Civil Rights Act would be defeated if we decided that
this federal claim grounded on an alleged violation of the federal constitution would
have to stagnate in the federal court until some nebulous or nonexistent remedy was
pursued like a will-o'-the-wisp in the state court." Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519,
525 (2d Cir. 1967), rev'g 257 F. Supp. 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1966); accord, Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
27. No. C-173-217, at 20.
28. Id. at 21.
29. "With triple occupancy, each inmate's share of airspace is about 146.5 cubic
feet, or approximately 355 cu. ft. less than his legal right. With double occupancy of
old cells, each inmate's share of airspace is about 220 cu. ft., or about 280 cu. ft. less
than the law allows an individual prisoner." Id. at 14.
30. Id. at 22.
31. "Outrageous, subhuman overcrowding must be ended swiftly. The bestial
crowding of three men into one small cell, with one man sleeping on the floor is an
affront to basic human decency. This intolerable, dehumanizing overcrowding is
fraught with a potential for epidemics and riots. It compounds the problems of violent
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ninety days to reduce the inmate population to "rated capacity," and
nine months to attain "design capacity." Up to two and one-half years
were allowed for prison administrators to satisfy completely the require-
ments of state and national laws; that is, they were given that long a
time to reach "lawful inmate capacity.1
32
Perhaps such analysis and use of capacity figures will in the future
be the determinant of constitutionality in this area. With a framework,
greater certainty will be possible in deciding if overcrowding alone
constitutes "cruel and unusual" punishment. Even if such a frame-
work is adopted, other factors, especially enforcement of judicial de-
crees as to capacity, will also have to be considered. The recently de-
cided Arkansas case of Hamilton v. Love33 points up this need.
In Hamilton the court entertained a section 1983 petition by in-
mates of the Pulaski County Jail, challenging the conditions of their
confinement. The court requested the assistance of an expert in penology
and prison administration to assess the maximum number of inmates,
as well as the minimum number of staff personnel necessary to guarantee
"that the lives and health of the detainees would be protected during
the period of their detainment."34  The Court found that regardless of
the size and qualifications of the staff, no more than 115 persons could
be housed in the facility as presently constructed.3" In order to assure
full compliance with his decree, the trial judge ordered the prison of-
ficials who were named as defendants in the litigation to do the follow-
ing: (1) file a report with the court on any day in which the population
exceeded the 115-man ceiling, (2) specify the reasons for such increase,
and (3) indicate the date on which the population would again return
to the appropriate (ceiling) figure.3
The significance of capacity assessments like those made in
Hamilton or Wayne County Jail Inmates is the fact that a court has
taken cognizance of the deleterious effect of overcrowded prison quar-
ters. Clearly, such overpopulation places burdens on the custodial staff
and minimizes the attention and assistance the staff can render for de-
tainees and prisoners. Inmate behavior is undoubtedly influenced in
large measure by the nature of the confining facility; thus hostility is far
more likely in an environment containing no "breathing room." In
Wayne County Jail Inmates the court went even further, stating that
assaults, suicides, homosexuality and mental illness which are endemic to any jail.
Three men to an undersized room has created an explosive situation which needs im-
mediate defusing." Id. at 24.
32. Id. at 25.
33. 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
34. Id. at 1194.
35. See also Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 714-15 (N.D. Ohio 1971)
(jail population ordered reduced to two men per cell).
36. 328 F. Supp. at 1195.
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close confinement, when worsened by overpopulation beyond the design
of the structure (and the regimen of enforced idleness), had a marked
effect on inmate mental health; in fact, court-appointed psychiatrists
described the effect as "iatrogenic," i.e., tending to produce or aggravate
mental illness.37
Fortunately, in dealing with the problem of overcrowding, most
prison administrators encourage reform as eagerly as do inmates them-
selves. Yet, the courts are hard pressed to deal with the problem on a
case-by-case basis, and it appears that legislative help would be warmly
endorsed. At present, however, the judicial remedy has been tailored
as best as can be done to the seriousness of the problem in the particular
challenged facility.
Ordinarily, the trial judge has ordered gradual reductions in the
number of inmates. Occasionally, however, a court has demanded
more immediate action, warning that a delay would compel him to order
the release of inmates until the prison population was no longer crowded
beyond constitutional limits.
3s
What appears to be needed is a means of limiting lockup treatment
to those persons who can be dealt with in no other way. At present,
there are many persons who could be treated or administered in a dif-
ferent manner. For example, alcoholics and drug addicts could be
removed to detoxification centers, reducing jail populations enormous-
ly. 39  Other administrative techniques would similarly reduce inmate
crowding: (1) issuance of summons or notices to appear (rather than
arrest) where a suspect presents no clear danger to society; (2) grant
of trial calendar priority to those persons who must remain in jail; (3)
extension of the use of parole and probation; and (4) development of
a judicial presumption that an individual qualifies for release on his
37. The judges in Wayne County Jail Inmates noted the high incidence of psy-
chosis among the jail inmates, as diagnosed by a psychiatrist who had just visited the
facility. The psychiatrist had seen "markedly paranoid" inmates, others who were
catatonic, and some with "full blown schizophrenia," all confined randomly with
healthy individuals in the jail population. Id. at 39-40. And in a California case,
Judge Alfonso Zirpoli commented that the cell conditions he found during a visit to
Alameda County's Santa Rita Rehabilitation Center were "cruel and unusual punish-
ment for man or beast." Brenneman v. Madigan, No. C 70-1911-AJZ (N.D. Cal.,
filed Sept. 8, 1970), Reporter's Transcript, Mar. 11, 1971, at 4, lines 6-7. "Threse]
cells are of such character as would presumably drive any person insane." Id. at 6,
lines 22-23.
38. E.g., Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Wayne
County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. C-173-217 (Mich. Cir. Ct.,
filed Jan. 25, 1971) at 22.
39. See testimony of Atty. Richard Berg before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, Oct. 25, 1971, San Francisco, at 9, on file at the Hastings
Law Journal.
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own recognizance, unless the prosecution can affirmatively demon-
strate a likelihood that the individual would not appear for trial.40
Inadequate Sanitation and Medical Care
The lack of adequate sanitation and medical care has also been
the focus of Eighth Amendment litigation. In certain instances, gen-
erally where institutional authorities have exhibited extreme callousness
as to inmate health problems, the courts have declared confinement in
unsanitary facilities unconstitutional.4 Unfortunately, because condi-
tions in most of these cases are extremely poor, it is difficult to de-
termine the point at which the lines are drawn-that is, the point at
which prison health problems threaten an inmate in an unconstitutional
fashion.
Perhaps the only guidelines can be attained by surveying and com-
paring the various cases decided in this area. Poor cell ventilation and
resulting temperature extremes have been mentioned with increasing
frequency as factors that warrant consideration in determining the con-
stitutionality vel non of a facility.42 Infestation by rats, mice, vermin,
and roaches may also be so intolerable as to warrant Eighth Amend-
ment relief.4 3  Issuance of uncleaned mattresses, 44 inoperative plumb-
ing,45 and denial of laundry facilities46 are also forms of unnecessary
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (inmates
confined nude in such filthy and unsanitary conditions that health was endangered);
Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969) (prisoner in solitary could
not flush his own toilet and was denied use of soap and toilet paper); Holt v. Sarver,
300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (toilets could not be flushed from inside, extreme
filth pervaded cells, and dirty mattresses had contributed to spread of infectious dis-
eases, including one fatal case of hepatitis); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D.
Cal. 1966) (cells filthy and inmates were deprived of soap, water, and toothbrush).
42. E.g., Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1190 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Hamil-
ton v. Schiro, No. 69-2443 (E.D. La. June 25, 1970) (finding of fact No. 11); McCray
v. State (Md. Cir. Ct. Nov. 11, 1971), noted in 40 U.S.L.W. 2307, 2310.
"During the winter the heat is uneven, sweltering in some areas, while other areas
are cold and damp. In the summertime the heat is stifling, sometimes reaching 120
degrees. We have here the makings of an epidemic." Wayne County Jail Inmates v.
Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. C-173-217 (Mich. Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 25, 1971),
at 56.
43. The fact that prisoners may be required to eat in their cells, generally ex-
plained as a precautionary rule to prevent dining hall riots, merely exacerbates the
problem of pest control. Hamilton v. Schiro, No. 69-2443 (E.D. La. June 25, 1970)
(finding of fact No. 12); Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs,
No. C-173-217 (Mich. Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 25, 1971) at 57.
44. E.g., Hamilton v. Schiro, No. 69-2443 (E.D. La. June 25, 1970) (finding of
fact No. 9).
45. Id., (finding of fact No. 6); accord, Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne
County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. C-173-217 (Mich Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 25, 1971) at 58.
46. E.g., Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1190 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Jones
v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
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environmental neglect which have contributed to findings of Eighth
Amendment violations. The courts have not tried to enunciate stand-
ards but have merely indicated when cell deterioration is severe enough
to evidence "the abandonment of basic concepts of humanity and de-
cency."Y
4 7
Associated with sanitation is the issue of medical care. In this
area, the courts have traditionally reacted differently in cases involving
a total denial of medical care than they have in situations where inmates
have merely attacked the adequacy of care they have received. For a
great many years, most federal tribunals held that only a conscious
failure to provide the most elementary health care would amount to an
Eighth Amendment violation. 48  Recently, the various courts have be-
gun to split on this issue.49 Thus, there is no longer a uniform policy
47. Plaintiffs normally rely upon inspection tours by the court or upon affidavits
submitted by experts or the inmates themselves. E.g., Brenneman v. Madigan, No.
C 70-1911-AJZ (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 8, 1970); Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne
County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. C-173-217 (Mich. Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 25, 1971). The
most effective results have been produced where the judge himself has inspected the
facility, perhaps because conditions have to be seen to be fully comprehended. Affi-
davits are useful not only in persuading the judge to make an inspection but also in
directing his attention to specific evils. Brenneman v. Madigan, No. C 70-1911-AJZ
(N.D. Cal., filed Sept. 8, 1970).
48. See generally Coppinger v. Townsend, 398 F.2d 392 (10th Cir. 1968); Talley
v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 692 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Redding v. Pate, 220 F. Supp.
124 (N.D. Il1. 1963). A prisoner will normally not be allowed to raise a constitu-
tional issue through a claim of medical malpractice. See United States ex rel. Hyde v.
McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1970); Turner, supra note 12, at 489, 490.
49. In the Third Circuit it has been stated that improper medical care is, with-
out more, not drastic enough a deprivation to constitute a denial of a federal right.
Pennsylvania ex rel. Gatewood v. Hendrick, 368 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 825 (1967). However, the Fourth Circuit has decided that a complaint al-
leging denial of necessary medical care produced a cause of action sufficient to justify
an award of damages. Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966); Hirons v.
Director, Patuxent Institution, 351 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1965). The Fifth Circuit has
upheld a claim under section 1983 where the allegations were that a sheriff refused
medical aid for plaintiff's broken neck and prevented him from summoning his own
doctor. Hughes v. Noble, 295 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1961). The Seventh Circuit has
decided that a complaint disclosing that the prisoner has received some medical aid
and alleging only inadequacy of care and treatment facilities and techniques did not
justify federal intervention. United States ex rel. Knight v. Ragen, 337 F.2d 425 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1964). But where a complaint alleged that police
prevented treatment of bullet wounds so serious as to necessitate subsequent amputation
of a prisoner's leg, the Seventh Circuit ruled that a cause of action was stated. Cole-
man v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957). In the Ninth Circuit, denial of med-
ical care has been deemed not actionable under section 1983 in the absence of excep-
tional circumstances. Stiltner v. Rhay, 371 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1967); Snow v. Gladden,
338 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1964).
At the district court level, several other cases have been resolved in favor of in-
mates claiming denial of medical treatment. E.g., Elsberry v. Haynes, 256 F. Supp.
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as to what types and degrees of deprivation must be alleged to state an
actionable claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment.
What appears to be evolving, however is a new standard of medi-
cal care for both sentenced inmates and detainees. This new test is sug-
gested in the following excerpt from a recent district court opinion:
If the treatment or lack of treatment of a prisoner is such that it
amounts to indifference or intentional mistreatment, it violates
the prisoner's constitutional guarantees. When a state undertakes
to imprison a person, thereby depriving him largely of his ability to
seek and find medical treatment, it is incumbent upon the state to
furnish at least a minimal amount of medical care for whatever
conditions plague the prisoner.50
The noticeable change in many courts has stemmed largely from
two factors: (1) greater overall public concern as to the prison system
and (2) concern about the growing drug epidemic among detainees
and prisoners.51 Judicial remedies are being devised or redesigned, de-
signed for the particular problem in each case. In at least one situation,
the judge has ordered that a facility remain under court supervision until
the inmate population appeared sufficiently protected.5 2  Clearly the
trend is one of greater involvement of the judiciary, since inspections and
other enforcement procedures appear to be the only means of assuring
compliance under the broad dictates of the Eighth Amendment.
Many factors enter into determining whether or not there has been
a constitutional violation under this new and growing standard. For
example, courts have declared invalid a treatment program that denied
special diets to diabetics, 53 that limited dental care to extractions only, 4
738 (W.D. Okla. 1966); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965);
Redding v. Pate, 220 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
50. Sawyer v. Sigler (D. Neb. Dec. 23, 1970), quoted in 8 CRIM. L. REP. 2317,
2318 (1971) (emphasis added). Another court has remarked that the common law
duty of a jailer requires him to try to protect confined persons from assault, suicide,
and preventable illness: "In the free community a man may see a doctor at his own
convenience. In jail he must see the jail physician under rules prescribed by the insti-
tution. In the free community he is not exposed to the hardships of confinement which
may bring out suicidal tendencies." Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Bd.
of Comm'rs, No. C-173-217, at 32 (Mich. Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 25, 1971).
51. The panel of judges in Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Bd. of
Comm'rs, No. C-173-217 (Mich. Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 25, 1971) stated that about one-
half of the newly admitted prisoners in Detroit's jail were addicted to opiate drugs.
Id. at 39. During the physical and psychological strain of drug withdrawal these
prisoners present a particularly high suicide risk. Jail populations are often composed
of a high percentage of inmates from substandard economic strata of society and bring
with them a correspondingly higher incidence of infectious diseases, tuberculosis, alco-
holism, and mental illness than in the population as a whole. See id. at 52.
52. See Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 718 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
53. Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. C-173-
217 at 61 (Mich. Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 25, 1971).
54. Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 97 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Wayne County
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or that could not guarantee delivery of prescribed medicine to a sick
inmate. 55 In addition, courts have recently condemned health and
safety conditions stemming from indiscriminate admission and rooming
procedures. In a few cases, judges have declared that it was cruel and
unusual to subject inmates to the risk of harm posed by facilities that
use no intake examinations with no means of screening and quarantining
those with contagious diseases.56 Several courts have labeled as "cruel
and unusual" the confinement of inmates in institutions with no isolation
areas for the mentally ill, the sex offenders, the drug addicts or the
abnormally vicious prisoners.
57
Practices Found Unconstitutional When Abused
Just as an institution-wide condition may be found cruel and un-
usual, so may a court declare a systematic practice to be unconstitutional.
The penal practices which have most often been subjected to the Eighth
Amendment test include punitive segregation, pretrial detention, civilian
staffing, and the potential abuse of the trusty system.
Punitive Segregation
Ever since the days when whipping and other physical punishments
were outlawed, assignment to "solitary" or "isolation" has been viewed
by inmates as the harshest internal disciplinary measure.58 Perhaps
as a result of its severity, this form of punishment was the first practice
to receive significant attention in prisoners' Eighth Amendment challeng-
es. 59 Nevertheless, few concrete guidelines have been established as
to the propriety of "isolation" practices, and they clearly remain among
the most resented and questioned techniques of penal administration.
That solitary confinement itself does not violate constitutional stand-
ards is well settled."° Assignment to "solitary" has generally been jus-
Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. C-173-217 at 50 (Mich. Cir. Ct.,
filed Jan. 25, 1971).
55. Hamilton v. Schiro, No. 69-2443 (finding of fact No. 25) (E.D. La. June
25, 1970).
56. Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. C-173-
217 at 51 (Mich. Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 25, 1971); Hamilton v. Schiro, No. 69-2443 (find-
ing of fact No. 19) (E.D. La. June 25, 1970).
57. E.g., Hamilton v. Schiro, No. 69-2443 (finding of fact No. 20) (E.D. La.
June 25, 1970).
58. One court has termed the isolation cells (rooms used for disciplinary pur-
poses) as "a prison within a prison." McCray v. State (Md. Cir. CL Nov. 11, 1971),
noted in 40 U.S.L.W. 2307 (1970).
59. See Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
60. E.g., Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970); Courtney v. Bishop,
409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 915 (1969); Graham v. Willingham,
384 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1967); Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Ga. 1970);
Roberts v. Barbosa, 227 F. Supp. 20 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
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tified on the basis that it protects the prison population as well as the
punished inmate from his possible acts of violence.61 However, even a
potentially violent prisoner is entitled to certain basic guarantees, and
the circumstances and conditions of any particular confinement, soli-
tary or otherwise, may so offend universally held views of elemental
human decency as to render the confinement unconstitutional.62
Since 1966 federal courts have declared that confinement in barren
"holes" styled after medieval dungeons constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. 63  But the extent of permissible disciplinary practice has
been difficult for the judiciary to delineate. The lack of statutory
guidelines and the rarity of appellate level decisions64 has left this area
of law quite unsettled. It may well be that only a case-by-case approach
(requiring a section 1983 class action or a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus) will determine the propriety of various extraordinarily severe
punitive practices. For these reasons alone, analysis of the scope of
relief to which the punished prisoner is entitled has been somewhat
difficult; it has been made more difficult by the fact that the few cases
have suggested a conflict in the courts as to both the constitutional test
to be applied and the severity of punishment allowable.
The constitutional test-the measuring rod as to whether a particu-
lar mode of punishment exceeds permissible dimensions-has been ex-
pressed in at least three different ways by courts assessing the validity
of a particular type of punitive segregation. Under one view, the prac-
tice is constitutional unless, under the circumstances, it is of such a
character as to shock the general conscience or to be intolerable to
61. But see Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127, 138-39 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), where
arguments of protection against suicide or destruction of personal property were held
insufficient to overcome the finding that such punitive measures were taken purely for
disciplinary purposes.
62. E.g., Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Hamilton v.
Schiro, No. 69-2443 (E.D. La. June 25, 1970); McCray v. State, (Md. Cir. Ct. Nov.
11, 1971). noted in 40 U.S.L.W. 2307 (1971).
63. See, e.g., Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Hancock
v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D.
Ark. 1969); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
64. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part sub
nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3431
(U.S. Mar. 6, 1972) is the most recent of the few existing circuit level discussions of
disciplinary practices. The New York prisoner in this case was shown to have received
exercise, a wholly adequate diet, group therapy, reading material (including legal ma-
terials), daily access to a doctor, and limitod cell furnishings (a toilet and wash basin,
running cold water, soap and a towel). The majority opinion concluded that these
conditions of confinement, though not perfect, were "several notches above those truly
inhumane conditions heretofore condemned by ourselves and other courts as 'cruel
and unusual.'" Id. at 194. See also Ford v. Board of Managers, 407 F.2d 937 (3d Cir.
1969) (held constitutional to deny running water or wash bowl and to feed inmate
bread and water diet except one regular meal each third day).
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fundamental fairness.65 Another line of analysis would find violative
of the Eighth Amendment any punishment "greatly disproportionate'
to the offense for which it is imposed."" A third viewpoint would re-
ject as unconstitutional even a practice applied in a pursuit of a legiti-
mate penal aim, if it extends beyond what is necessary to achieve that
goal.0 7 These three methods of determining what is "cruel and unusual"
seem to constitute really three different tests; yet while some courts have
employed them in the alternative, others have used them in combina-
tion.
68
The first of these constitutional "tests" has been applied most
often, perhaps because it was derived from the earliest decisions on the
scope of the Eighth Amendment. 69 An example of its modern usage
can be seen in the 1971 case of Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne
County Board of Commissioner ° where a state three-judge panel held
unconstitutional the conditions of punitive segregation in Detroit's county
jail. Prisoners of both sexes had been confined for substantial periods
of time in unlighted disciplinary cells measuring 7%' x 7' in floor-
space. These cells were completely bare, save for narrow concrete
slab bunks. No prisoner was allowed a mattress, bedding, or blankets.
At times the weather was so cold that leaking water in the cells formed
icicles. The court remarked with some horror that each of the prisoners
was confined without eating utensils; one inmate was described as hav-
ing to "[eat] with his hands or [lap] up his food like a dog."7' The
basic implements of personal hygiene (such as toilet paper, soap, wash-
ing water, towels) were denied to persons incarcerated in these cells.
72
65. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 890-91 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissent-
ing); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 378 (1910).
66. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1961); Fulwood v. Clemmer,
206 F. Supp. 370, 379 (D.D.C. 1962). The language of the Eighth Amendment itself is
based on the notion of proportionality, forbidding excessive bail or fines.
67. Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1971); Dearman v.
Woodson, 429 F.2d 1288, 1290 (10th Cir. 1970); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786,
791 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
68. See text accompanying notes 77-83 infra.
69. See note 14 supra.
70. Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. C-173-
217, at 100 (Mich. Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 25, 1971).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 100-01. Persons incarcerated in these cells were forced to eliminate
waste into a small hole in the floor. If the prisoner wanted water for washing or
drinking, other than what might be brought at the whim of a guard, the only available
supply was that which flushed the floor drain toilet. The only light in these basement
cells was that which had managed to penetrate the narrow mesh slits in the steel doors.
Neither reading nor writing materials were permitted, nor were visitors allowed. The
inmates were given no exercise. Thus they spent 24 hours a day under these condi-
tions prior to their class action. Id.
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Two inspection visits of the Wayne County facility were made by
the three judges who constituted the panel that decided this case. After
the panel returned from the second visit, one judge submitted an exhaus-
tive opinion condemning the punitive technique. He comments as fol-
lows:
Confinement as barbarous as this must threaten the health of the
prisoner. Confinement as debased and degrading as this must,
inevitably, erode the spirit and undermine the sanity of even the
strongest man. Confinement under such conditions shocks the
conscience. Its dehumanizing aspects are an affront to civilized
notions of rudimentary human decency. We cannot believe that
such confinement is a permissible exercise of governmental authority
over a citizen of a civilized society in the year 1971.
73
The court ordered abandonment of the most abusive practices.
74
The judges relied on the rather subjective guidelines of the Eighth
Amendment as support for any relief which would raise the prison
standards to a conscionable level. The tribunal expressed regret for
the lack of statutory assistance in such cases but followed the pattern
established in numerous other decisions-that is, they resorted to their
own "sense of decency" and "conscience" to determine the constitutional
issue.'- Their decision, as with all others under the first "test," seems
necessarily subjective; it tuned completely on what the judges viewed as
the "evolving standards of decency.
'76
The operation of the second "test," that which focuses on the ques-
tion whether a given form of punishment is "disproportionate" to the in-
fraction for which it was assessed, actually involves a judicial balancing.
On the one side, the court considers the social and administrative
harm caused by the prisoner's conduct; on the other, the emotional and
physical damage caused the inmate by the particular method of punish-
73. Id.
74. "If the hole is to be used as a disciplinary device, changes must be made.
Inmates must be given bedding, mattresses, and the necessities of personal hygiene,
such as toilet paper, soap, towels, and . .. sanitary napkins. They must be given eat-
ing utensils at meals . . . . The hole must be heated adequately . . . . Adequate
light must be provided. Inmates housed in the hole must be given fresh drinking water,
and water for washing, apart from that which flushes the floor drain toilet." Id. at
102. The court also ordered the cell size increased to conform to state law (8' x 8').
Reading and writing materials could be withheld, except as requested by an inmate for
the purpose of writing to his lawyer of record, to a court or to some governmental
body. Id. at 103.
75. See, e.g., Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 1970) ("base, inhu-
man and barbaric"); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786, 792 (M.D. Tenn. 1969)
("Barbaric," "debasing," "violates basic standards of human decency"); Holt v. Sarver,
300 F. Supp. 825, 833 (E.D. Ark. 1969) ("grossly excessive," "shocking or disgusting");
and Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 680 (N.D. Cal. 1966) ("shocking and de-
based" conditions justify court's investigation to "restore the primal rule of a civilized
community").
76. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1957).
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ment. Differing scales of values applied in separate courts could argu-
ably yield varying results under this test.
In perhaps the most widely-publicized example of the use of the
second "test," Sostre v. Rockefeller,77 a federal district court in New
York entertained an inmate challenge of a host of practices in the state's
correctional facilities. The lower court decided that the imposition of
punitive segregation on the plaintiff for an indefinite period of time
(until he complied with certain prison regulations) was entirely dispro-
portionate to any infraction of prison rules that he may have committed.
Consequently, the court held such a pxactice clearly barred by the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition. 8 On appeal, however, the Second
Circuit rejected this reasoning,79 holding instead that the inmate's abil-
ity to obtain release from isolation at any time through cooperation with
penal authorities rendered the punishment constitutional.80 It was no
longer conceived as a fixed penalty disproportionate to the infraction
of the prisoner. One of the dissenting judges criticized this logic, noting
that the same observation could be made if the inmate were tortured
until he agreed to abide by prison rules.81
The third "test," the one requiring a clear expression of the neces-
sity of a particular punitive practice (showing its administrative pur-
pose), has perhaps been the least frequently used. In one rather re-
cent decision, however, a federal court in Tennessee condemned a prac-
tice as unconstitutional under that standard. In that case, Hancock v.
Avery,82 the prisoner had been confined in a bare cell and forced to
remain nude throughout his stay in segregation. The court stated that
the administrative aims of the particular form of punishment-to pro-
tect other inmates and to minimize the likelihood of escape-could have
been attained "without requiring a prisoner to live in the exacerbated
conditions of filth and discomfort demonstrated in the instant case."83
Although the three "tests" (which have arisen entirely through case
law) do offer some general guidelines as to the severity of punitive prac-
tices the courts will allow, there is as yet no semblance of uniformity
in measuring "excessive cruelty." It would appear that, until a con-
77. 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part sub nom., Sostre v. McGin-
nis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3431 (U.S. Mar. 6, 1972).
78. 312 F. Supp. at 870.
79. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191-92 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40
U.S.L.W. 3431 (U.S. Mar. 6, 1972).
80. Id. at 192-94.
81. Id. at 208. Section 140 of the New York Correction Law authorized a
warden to commit a prisoner to segregation when "necessary . . . to produce [his]
entire submission and obedience" and to keep him there "until he shall be reduced to
submission and obedience." Id. at 184.
82. 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
83. Id. at 792.
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sensus is reached by the courts as to the constitutional minimum in puni-
tive procedures, only statutory assistance at the state and federal levels
can reasonably guarantee that a prisoner will not be subjected to cruel
and unusual punishment. In this regard, consideration must be given
to hygiene, length of segregation, diets and cell conditions. Each fac-
tor will have to be fully evaluated with regard to its purpose and effect
and with regard to the ability of administrative personnel to remedy
substandard conditions.
Pretrial Detention
The State's Only Legitimate Purpose
Although a person theoretically may not be "punished" prior to
conviction,"' an accused person's inability to raise bail will often result
in his detention in jail until trial. Punitive measures in such a context
appear entirely out of harmony with the presumption of innocence. 5
In reality, however, because facilities are often used to hold pretrial
detainees as well as those already convicted and sentenced, the possi-
bility is great that the formel class will receive equally harsh discipline,
particularly where the two classes are randomly mixed throughout a jail
population. 6
Clearly the standard of treatment for pretrial detainees should in-
deed be superior to that accorded sentenced prisoners.87  Although
some of the problems of administration remain the same whether an
inmate is a convict or merely a detainee, the latitude granted institu-
tional authorities in dealing with detainees should be radically reduced.
84. Tyler v. Ciccone, 299 F. Supp. 684 (W.D. Mo. 1969). Blackstone described
pre-trial detention as follows: "[T]his imprisonment, as has been said, is only for safe
custody, and not for punishment: therefore, in this dubious interval between commit-
ment and trial, a prisoner ought to be used with the utmost humanity; and neither be
loaded with needless fetters nor subjected to other hardships than such as are requisite
for the purpose of confinement only." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 300.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI. The "presumption of innocence" is used to refer
to standards or rules of evidence, and is usually shorthand for the fact that the prose-
cution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Wilson v. United States, 232
U.S. 563, 569-70 (1913). Here, however, it denotes also the Fifth Amendment guar-
antee that a person will not be punished or deprived of life or liberty until he or she
is found deserving of such deprivation through due process of law.
86. See, e.g., Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Brenne-
man v. Madigan, No. C 70-1911-AJZ (N.D. Cal., filed Sept. 8, 1970).
87. "It is clear that the conditions for pretrial detention must not only be equal
to, but superior to, those permitted for prisoners serving sentences for the crimes they
have committed against society." Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D.
Ark. 1971). Because of the presumption of innocence, a practice constituting legiti-
mate punishment for a sentenced prisoner may be wholly invalid if inflicted upon a
detainee. See generally Note, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79 YALE L.J. 941,
957 (1970).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Greater recognition is required of the differing purposes of incarcera-
tion for the two kinds of inmates. The detainees are confined only
because their presence at trial must be assured; the convicted prisoners
are incarcerated for entirely different purposes, including rehabilitation,
punishment and deterrence of further crimes."8
Growth of the "Least Restrictive Means" Test
The scope of protection afforded pretrial detainees by the Eighth
Amendment was first litigated when a group of arrestees was alleged
to have been treated worse than were convicted inmates. In Anderson
v. Nosser"9 plaintiffs were arrested in a large group during a protest
against racial discrimination in Natchez, Mississippi in 1965. Thirty-
nine cells in the state penitentiary's maximum security unit were cleared
to house the more than 250 detainees. 90 The subhuman treatment in-
flicted upon these detainees was held to be a transgression of "even
those minimal 'standards of decency' mandated in the treatment of
convicted felons."91
In Anderson the plaintiffs had been confined separately under spe-
cial circumstances. In at least two other instances, federal courts have
examined situations where detainees were "mingled indiscriminately"
with sentenced prisoners.92 Absent separation of the two classes, a
higher standard of care had clearly not been required for detainees. One
88. See the definition of punishment suggested in H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE
CRnmnAL SANcnoN 21 (1968). See also T. HONDERiCH, PUNISHMENT-THE SUPPOSED
JUSTICAnTIONS (1969). See generally Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1191-92
(E.D. Ark. 1971).
89. 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971).
90. Id. at 187.
91. Id. at 191. "On arrival all male prisoners were required to strip naked and
all women prisoners were ordered to remove their shoes, stockings, sweaters, coats, jew-
elry, and wigs. All were compelled to consume a laxative and were deprived of all per-
sonal belongings, including sanitary napkins and medicines. The prisoners were then led
to the cells. Up to eight persons were placed in each cell, which contained two steel
bunks without mattresses or other bedding, a toilet without a seat, and a washbasin.
There were no towels or soap and there was inadequate toilet paper. The temperature
ranged from 60 to 70 degrees, the chill being aggravated by exhaust fans which blew in-
termittently on the occupants. Some of the men eventually were permitted to get their
underwear, but others were nude for a period of 36 hours. Many were subjected to
blood tests. Moreover, while standing in the prison courtyard awaiting processing
several plaintiffs were kicked, pushed, cursed, and abused by highway patrolmen and
other guards." Id. at 187-88. Plaintiffs brought several tort actions in June of 1969,
and a jury returned a verdict for defendants. Subsequently plaintiffs appealed, relying
on section 1983 to sustain their contention that defendants should be held liable as a
matter of law. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed and remanded for the
assessment of damages due plaintiffs but also allowed the trial court to cure any
prejudice to defendants caused by plaintiffs' delay.
92. Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 97 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Brenneman
v. Madigan, No. C 70-1911-AJZ (N.D. Cal., filed Sept. 8, 1970).
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of these cases, Jones v. Wittenberg,93 invalidated several practices in
the county jail serving Toledo, Ohio, where the inmate population was
fully three-fourths detainees.94  The evidence in Jones revealed: (1) a
failure to provide inmates with any clothing or facilities to wash the
clothes they were wearing when they arrived; (2) issuance of blankets
which may not have been washed since their last use; (3) a lack of
mirrors (only two in the entire jail); (4) food preparation undertaken
in the basement under leaking sewer pipes; and (5) minimal visitation
rights (including attorney-client) with no semblance of privacy.9" As
the court commented:
[When the total picture of . . . Lucas County Jail is examined,
what appears is confinement in cramped and overcrowed quarters,
lightless, airless, damp and filthy with leaking water and human
wastes, slow starvation, deprivation of most human contacts, except
with others in the same sub-human state, no exercise or recreation,
little if any medical attention, no attempt at rehabilitation, and for
those who . . . lash out at their surroundings, confinement,
stripped of clothing and every last vestige of humanity, in a sort of
oubliette. . . . Most jails are bad, but this one is unusually bad.96
Perhaps the most thorough judicial study of pretrial detention con-
ditions to date was entertained by an Arkansas district court in the case
of Hamilton v. Love.9" That lawsuit was a class action brought by
detainees in the jail of Pulaski County, Arkansas. The court held that
because the conditions of detainment in the county jail were essentially
punitive the detainees were subject to conditions which violated the
strictures of the Eighth Amendment and the due process requirements
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.98 The court further stated
that, since detainees are not "convicts" or "prisoners" (having been con-
victed of no crime), they should not be subjected to any "punishment,"
whether cruel and unusual or not. 9  In conclusion, the court held that
the conditions of incarceration for detainees must, cumulatively, add up
to the least restrictive means of achieving the state's only legitimate
purpose-that is, to assure the detainee's presence at trial.100
Unduly punitive pretrial conditions undoubtedly have an impact
on the ability of those accused to defend themselves adequately and to
present a favorable impression in court. It may also cause them to alter
pleas in an attempt to minimize or to avoid further incarceration.'
93. 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
94. Id. at 96.
95. Id. at 96-97.
96. Id. at 99.
97. 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
98. Id. at 1193.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1192.
101. Empirical studies have indicated that detainees are far more likely than per-
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Adoption by other district courts of Hamilton's "least restrictive means"
test for determining the constitutionality of pretrial detention practices
could invalidate present conditions in many of America's county jails.
The widespread practices of confinement in small individual cells, denial
of recreation and exercise, and restricted mail privileges are subject to
question when this test is applied. If they do not represent the least
restrictive means of insuring a defendant's presence at trial, such prac-
tices violate constitutional guidelines under this test and must fall as un-
necessarily punitive.
Inadequate Civilian Staffing and the Trusty System
Because many jails and prisons are considerably understaffed,
10 2
docile and trusted inmates are often allowed to perform certain tasks
that would otherwise occupy the time of civilian personnel. In return,
these "trusties" receive special privileges not dispensed to other in-
mates.'0 8 This system, although theoretically for the benefit of the
prison population, may result in practices which violate the Eighth
Amendment
The most comprehensive judicial inquiry into a trusty system came
in the Eighth Circuit case of Holt v. Strver'0 where the Arkansas prac-
tice of delegating over 90 percent of the prison system's functions to
trusties was declared unconstitutional. 05 While the value of according
trusty status to deserving inmates was itself not questioned, the court
was horrified by the abuses inherent in one Arkansas institution:
The few free world people are only nominally in command of the
situation at Cummins [Prison Farm], and the trusties could take it
over in a moment. Perhaps the reason they do not do so is that
they do not want to spoil a good thing.' 06
The principal defect in the Arkansas system was the use of trusties
as guards-a practice which officially existed only in Arkansas, Louis-
iana, and Mississippi. 1 7 Although this procedure was condemned in
sons released on bail to be convicted and serve longer sentences, even when all other
variables relating to likelihood of conviction are held constant. Rankin, The Effect of
Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 641 (1964). Undoubtedly the greatest hindrance
to the detainee is that confinement impedes his ability to communicate with witnesses,
attorneys and other individuals necessary to the preparation of a successful defense.
Cf. Kinney v. Lenon, 425 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1970) (black juvenile released from cus-
tody for purpose of aiding in his own defense where white attorneys would have had
difficulty in interviewing possible witnesses).
102. See CALIFORNIA STATE EMPLOYEES' Ass'N, CALIFORNIA PRIsoNs IN CRISis,
Appendix A (Sept. 24, 1971).
103. See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 373-76 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
104. 309 F. Supp. 362.
105. Id. at 382.
106. Id. at 373.
107. Id.
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Holt, the court did not illustrate as clearly in that case the limitations to
be placed in filling staff vacancies as did the district court in Hamilton
v. Love.' In Hamilton the court said that there was a constitutional
minimum on the number of civilian personnel each facility must possess,
principally in order to "protect the lives and safety of the detainees."'0 9
The importance of this decision is its suggestion that the judiciary has
the capacity both to assess the hazards of nonsupervision of a given
institution and to calculate the state's duty of protection to the population
confined therein and to order that correctional authorities conform to
minimum levels of service and protection." 0
One other interesting problem highlighted by an Eighth Amendment
challenge of an abusive trusty procedure involved the applicability of
section 1983 relief. In a 1971 case, Roberts v. Williams,"' a prison
warden selected for guard duty over a road gang a 23 year old trusty.
The trusty possessed only a fourth grade education and had been con-
victed and sentenced to prison for assault with intent to commit murder.
The trusty was permitted to carry a twelve-gauge pump shotgun in the
course of his duty. The court upheld the complaint filed by prisoners
who worked on that road gang on the ground that they had been sub-
jected to a form of "cruel and unusual punishment.""' 2
Matters of Defense, Procedure and Remedies
No discussion of Eighth Amendment litigation would be complete
without a discussion of the defenses that have been raised, procedural
problems, and appropriate remedies.
The Defense of Poverty
In Eighth Amendment litigation, penal administrators and public
officials have repeatedly sought to explain poor conditions as the result
of insufficient funds. They have stated, essentially, that nothing can be
done to alleviate unfortunate conditions or practices without further
financial allocations." 3 However, the courts have consistently held that
108. 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
109. Id. at 1196; accord, Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 715-16 (N.D.
Ohio 1971).
110. Because staffing problems may only be temporary and depend largely on
size of inmate population in the given facility (the larger the prison population, the
greater the burden on staff personnel), constitutional minima in this area will vary.
Hamilton recognized the ability of the courts to assess adjustments made in staffing for
the purposes of conformity with institutional dictates. 328 F. Supp. at 1196.
111. 39 U.S.L.W. 2590 (5th Cir. Apr. 1, 1971).
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971);
Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825, 830-31 (E.D. Ark. 1969); Jordan v. Fitzbarris, 257
F. Supp. 674, 680-81 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (testimony of prison officials).
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nothwithstanding the economic difficulty involved, prison and jail of-
ficials are subject to the same constitutional restrictions as are ordinary
citizens. 114 Indeed, no "consideration of convenience and thrift [could]
outweigh the rudiments of human decency. Inconvenience and expense
are the inevitable price to be paid for many years of callous neglect."'1 5
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Injunctive relief is the surest method of permanently ameliorating
the unlawful treatment of detainees and prisoners. The standard prayer
in complaints alleging infliction of cruel and unusual punishment re-
quests both a declaration of unconstitutionality and an order permanently
enjoining those practices designated as invalid. And most importantly,
the courts have not hesitated in certain cases to issue injunctions that
will alter the mode of confinement in order to comply with constitutional
standards." 6
In many situations, however, prison officials have avoided the
granting of a permanent injunction (even where the court had declared
unconstitutional punishment) by convincing the court that the invalid
policy had been or would subsequently be discontinued."17  Where a
permanent injunction is nevertheless deemed necessary by the court,
the judge may require submission to him of new rules that will carefully
limit the use of a particular practice, such as punitive segregation."
8
Plans may also be requested from the defendants, the institutional au-
thorities themselves, as to the most appropriate means of correcting physi-
cal or staffing defects in a given facility."'
114. "Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall
be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a
government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe
the law scrupulously. . . . If the government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds con-
tempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
115. Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. C-173-
217 (Mich. Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 25, 1971) at 29 (memo op.). "Inadequate resources
can never be an adequate justification for the state's depriving any person of his con-
stitutional rights. If the state cannot obtain the resources to detain persons awaiting
trial in accordance with minimum constitutional standards, then the state simply will
not be permitted to detain such persons." Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1194
(E.D. Ark. 1971). In Jackson v. Bishop, Judge (now Justice) Blackmun remarked that
"Eh]umane considerations and constitutional requirements are not . . . to be . . . lim-
ited by dollar considerations." 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968).
116. E.g., Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786, 792 (M.D. Tenn. 1969). See Jones
v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 720-21 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
117. Cf. Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
118. E.g., Morris v. Travisono, 7 CiuM. L. REP. 2001 (D.R.I. Mar. 11, 1970).
119. See Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. C-173-
217 (Mich. Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 25, 1971); Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D.
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Several federal courts which have found conditions in need of im-
provement have turned to the techniques of settlement-such as con-
ciliation and negotiation-to maximize responsiveness on the part of
institutional authorities.120 This approach by federal courts has de-
veloped as something of a trend in cases where compliance is reasonably
anticipated on the part of defendant administrators. The principal
advantage of an arbitration or settlement conference, of course, is that
inmate complaints and suggestions may be aired and given due consid-
eration in the process of reforming rules and procedures.12' Other
procedures recently employed by various tribunals include extensive
consultation with penologists and other experts 122 and retention of juris-
diction for significant lengths of time.123  When either injunctive relief
or settlement-style consent decrees are employed, the court may choose
to retain jurisdiction for an extended period, either in a supervisory
role or as an arbiter in the processes of submitting plans, making rules,
or developing acceptable prison procedures. Perhaps this continued
judicial involvement better enables the court to balance the justified
complaints of prisoners against the legitimate needs and interests of
prison administrators. Certainly such an approach seems more palat-
able than continued courtroom controversy. Indeed this approach ap-
pears to reduce the adversariness of the litigants and focus more clearly
on the need and the methodology to improve unfavorable conditions of
prison confinement.
Damages
Damages are a standard remedy in lawsuits brought under section
1983 for violation of constitutional rights under color of state law.'
2 4
In Eighth Amendment cases in particular, plaintiffs may receive not only
injunctive relief but also remuneration for damages personally suf-
fered.125  Where a trier of fact believes that punishment has been cruel
Ohio 1971); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Brenneman v.
Madigan, No. C 70-1911-AJZ (N.D. Cal., filed Sept. 8, 1970).
120. E.g., Morris v. Travisono, 7 CRIM. L. REP. 2001 (D.R.I. Mar. 11, 1970).
121. Id. (oral testimony of prisoners). See Brenneman v. Madigan, No. C 70-
1911-AJZ (N.D. Cal., filed Sept. 8, 1970) (inmate affidavits).
122. Expert testimony is of special importance in Eighth Amendment litigation.
Noted penologists, ex-wardens, and psychiatrists can give evaluations of what they
have observed on visits that will often be weighed more heavily by the court than in-
mate complaints. Also of great value are inspections and reports made by fire mar-
shals, building code inspectors, and doctors. See Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182,
1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
123. Jurisdiction was retained for 18 months in Morris v. Travisono, 7 CirM. L.
REP. 2001 (D.R.I. March 11, 1970). See also Brenneman v. Madigan, No. C 70-
1911-AJZ (N.D. Cal., filed Sept. 8, 1970) (rehearings every thirty days).
124. E.g., Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 646 (9th Cir. 1962).
125. E.g., Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd on other
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and unusual, it may award compensatory damages based on one or all
of the following factors: physical deprivations, needless degradation,
loss of work opportunity, and mental anguish.12 Supreme Court Jus-
tice Brennan indicated the expanding nature of compensatory relief
under section 1983 when he stated that federal judges were "duty-
bound to enrich the jurisprudence' of federal law by incorporating
remedies available in the state where the judges were sitting.127 Most
of the traditional elements of the law of damages appear to be equally
applicable to inmates. 28
The propriety of granting punitive damages has been acknowledged
in certain Eighth Amendment cases, at least those in which defendants
have displayed a definite pattern of misconduct.1 29 Nevertheless, judges
have consistently evidenced their unwillingness to award punitive dam-
ages in Eighth Amendment cases.13 0 It appears, in fact, that punitive
damages will be awarded only upon a showing that the offending prison
officials acted with actual knowledge that they were violating a right
secured by the Constitution or by other laws, or with reckless disregard
of the likelihood that such a right was thus violated. 1 '
Limitations on the Courts
In recent years, the courts have provided the principal relief for
the complicated problems that now beset the penal system. Reluctantly,
they intervened in prison and jail administration when it became evident
that local authorities were not policing themselves adequately. By now
the judicial branch has made it clear that penal institutions must operate
within the confines of an expanded Eighth Amendment, but the courts
grounds sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40
U.S.L.W. 3431 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1972), (prisoner awarded $25 per day for 372 days of
wrongful segregation); Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127, 144 (N.D.N.Y. 1970)
($1,500 allotted).
126. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40
U.S.L.W. 3431 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1972).
127. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, (1970), cited in Wright v.
McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127, 143 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
128. "This liability, however, is entirely personal in nature intended to be satis-
fied out of the individual's own pocket. Moreover, the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
as codified by the Eleventh Amendment, bars the exaction of a fine from a state
treasury without the state's consent, at least on account of tortious actions com-
mitted by its agents under the circumstances of this case." Sostre v. McGinnis, 442
F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3431 (U.S. Mar. 6, 1972).
129. Id. See also Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
130. E.g., Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 721 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Wright
v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127, 144 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
131. See Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
40 U.S.L.W. 3431 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1972).
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are nevertheless powerless to initiate a coordinated program to upgrade
these same facilities:
The judicial activity has been a last resort to stop clearly uncon-
stitutional activity, and has not provided a coordinated positive
approach to these problems. In addition, prisoners participating in
legal actions risk retaliation from jail personnel. It is essential for
other governmental agencies to assume a more active role.
132
Because the conditions required for a finding of unconstitutionality
must be so severe, it is accurate to say that the Eighth Amendment is
presently helpful in abating only the very worst practices. In fact,
litigation in this area, even if resolved on behalf of the complaining in-
mates, may succeed in elevating their standard of treatment merely a
level or so above that designated "cruel and unusual punishment."
The nebulous character of the constitutional standard itself con-
tributes enormously to the inconsistency of decisions from one jurisdic-
tion to another.13 Indeed, the very flexibility which enables the Eighth
Amendment to be an instrument of penal reform in one jurisdiction
may have an opposite effect elsewhere. Considering these limitations
on judicial efficiency in the area of penology, any further improvements
in our prisons systems must be legislative or administrative in origin.1
3 4
Conclusion
The language of the Eighth Amendment proscribes only the worst
of punishments. Consequently, few means of incarceration were serious-
ly questioned under its aegis until the past few years. This was true
even though the Supreme Court more than sixty years ago described
the scope of the Eighth Amendment in the following manner:
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and pur-
poses. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth.'
35
The wider application to which the constitutional limitation on pun-
ishments has eventually been extended now includes local jails and state
prisons. The question today is not whether imprisonment, which unlike
capital punishment may vary in degrees and duration, is justifiable,
but what manner of confinement is justifiable.
132. Testimony of Atty. Richard Berg before Subcomm. No. 3, House Comm. on
the Judiciary, Oct. 25, 1971, San Francisco, at p. 8, on file at The Hastings Law Journal.
133. See text accompanying notes 65-68 supra.
134. "We do not doubt the magnitude of the task ahead before our correctional
systems become acceptable and effective from a correctional, social and humane view-
point, but the proper tools for the job do not lie with a remote federal court. The
sensitivity to local nuance, opportunity for daily perseverence, and the human and
monetary resources required lie rather with legislators, executives, and citizens in their
communities." Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40
U.S.L.W. 3431 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1972).
135. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
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Relying on the flexibility of the Eighth Amendment, courts have
now included several previously ignored elements in their consideration
of the constitutionality of imprisonment. Thus the scope of the Eighth
Amendment has mushroomed. Judicial imposition of inmate popula-
tion limits for particular jails has developed as a remedy for severe
overcrowding and its detrimental effects. Several constitutional yard-
sticks have been adopted for the purpose of eliminating abuse of puni-
tive segregation. Unduly harsh conditions of pretrial detention are now
of questionable constitutional validity under the least restrictive means
test. Systematic denials of medical care and unsanitary or wholly
deteriorated physical structures have both contributed to declarations of
unconstitutional punishment. Negligent delegation of authority to
trusties and inadequate civilian staffing have likewise just recently been
included within the umbrella of Eighth Amendment scrutiny.
Although impressive advances have occurred of late through resort
to the Eighth Amendment, in truth its application has been limited to
complex and time consuming litigation affecting only one institution
at a time. Definition of its scope still is proceeding on a case-by-case
basis. These facts indicate a need for some degree of precision and
uniformity, available perhaps only with the assistance of concrete legis-
lative standards. 136
Unfortunately, legislatures have thus far been "almost totally un-
responsive to prisoner efforts to seek redress in positive ways.' 31 7
Guidelines have, nevertheless, quite recently been suggested through the
efforts of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency in "A Model
Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners." Suggested programs
involving independent reviewing authorities' 38 and ombudsmen' 39 are
worth investigation at the legislative level. Before the further outbreak
of violence in our nation's prisons, these possibilities and countless
others must be weighed carefully. Prompt action must then be taken on
the most constructive suggestions. The prisons will not wait.
Gary Wood*
136. MODEL AcT, supra note 7, at 9-14.
137. Id. at 3 (foreword by M. Rector, Director of NCCD).
138. Id. at 18-19.
139. Id. at 17-18. See also Spector, A Prison Librarian Looks at Writ-Writing,
56 CALiF. L. Rnv. 365 (1968). Maryland has such an ombudsman. MD. ANN.
CODE, art. 41, § 204F (Supp. 1971).
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